

EUROPE - A SPACE FOR TESTIMONY?

THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM IN THE 21st CENTURY

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This paper will deal with the concept of testimony or witnessing ¹, which plays such an essential role in both the Christian and Muslim traditions. I will argue that, in order to revitalize European civil society, community level faith-based initiatives must reconsider the link between religion, culture and politics in their daily lives. For Muslims this means adapting the day-to-day expression of their faith to the socio-economic norms of European society. For Christians this means reintroducing their faith in God in areas as disparate as business, education, city planning or environmental protection. For both groups this will require a rethinking of the secularist consensus upon which the political systems of the last several centuries have been built.

I. Supplying more Questions than Answers

In following I will open by introducing two broad fields of inquiry dealing with the religious roots of political culture and the cultural roots of community interaction respectively. In the pages below I will elaborate on a variety of ideas which are the result of my scholarly work in the fields of minority and migration studies, on the one hand, and my experience in interfaith and multicultural initiatives in Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Italy and Lebanon, on the other. By illustrating the tremendous potential that lies in a reassessment of our common Abrahamic faith, I will attempt to demonstrate that local European communities offer the optimal "space for testimony" for both Christians and Muslims in the coming years.

Questions related to religion and political culture

Can and should religion be a part of our political culture? Have religious values and virtues been able to play the positive role in structuring relations between individuals and groups that their adherents claim they must?

Is the concept of a "marketplace of ideas," in which individuals and groups freely choose options and exchange opinions, solely a secular invention, or does it have religious roots? Can this "free market" help structure the "terms of trade" according to which we can cooperate in God's work in time – the essence of religion?

Is the separation of church and state a liability, asset or perhaps a prerequisite for faith-based cultural and political dialogue? If we can trace the roots of secularism back, beyond the Enlightenment of the 18th century, to the religious reform movements of the 16th century, might this help establish the foundation for an Abrahamic approach to political culture?

Are the same socio-economic forces that facilitated the introduction of secularism in the West now helping Muslim immigrant communities rediscover the deep-rooted appreciation for tolerance and dialogue inherent in their own cultural traditions?

Questions related to the culture of faith-based community interaction

If the cultural heritage of a people reflects the ways in which they have responded to the inspiration of the Holy Spirit over time, where better can we study the impact that this has had on the interaction between peoples, if not on the lowest level of agenda setting and decision making?

The way in which we educate our children, interact in the workplace, run our businesses and develop our neighbourhood infrastructure is still largely determined by community leaders on the local level. Here the cultural traditions of indigenous and immigrant peoples confront each other on an almost daily basis.

Will "political Christianity" respond to the challenge of "political Islam" and help redefine the way in which people interact locally? Can we find enough common ground so that we can work together to confront those forces that are threatening to undermine our mutually held values and virtues?

In summary, this paper sets out to determine whether religion, after the demise of the secular master narratives of the 19th and 20th centuries, can not only fill up some of the space that has now been vacated by liberalism, conservatism and social democracy, but much more, whether the Abrahamic religions can build on their ancient traditions in order to reinvent themselves as political actors in the coming decades.

Top-down or bottom up?

When considering the root causes for the separation of church and state, 18th century enlightened secularism is normally seen as the product and further development of the 17th century discoveries of Isaac Newton, the rationalism of René Descartes and the empiricism of Francis Bacon and John Locke. This top-down approach, portraying the modern desire to loosen the embrace of religious institutions and political power structures as the logical conclusion of rational reflection and scholarly discourse, enjoys consensual support within both the scholarly and lay communities. As we will see, this approach can also be taken when

discussing the need to secularize Islam, by searching for arguments supporting the separation of church and state in the traditions of the early Islamic community of believers² as well as the Koran itself.

Anabaptist scholars, as well as many labor historians, locate the origins of the separation of church and state in the thinking of the Radical Reformation during the early 16th century. For them, secularism³ is not merely the product of this radical Christian community's split with the political power elites, based on a reinterpretation of the New Testament; of at least equal importance was the "political economy" of this historic development. For Social Democrats like Karl Kautsky and historians of the Reformation, including Cornelius Dyck, Walter Klaasen and Rudolf Palme, the socio-economic transition from late feudalism to early capitalism created a need, a "market" if you will, for an approach to religion which emphasized individual autonomy and personal accountability, both being equally linked to social responsibility and political democracy.⁴ The Anabaptist or Täufer movement offered the educated burghers of Switzerland and the Netherlands, the rapidly impoverishing peasants of Central and Southern Germany and the affluent and free spirited Alpine miners of Salzburg and Tirol⁵ an approach to God and community free of the influences of both the Vatican and the local political power brokers. By rejecting a coalition with the state and the use of force on the part of Christians (e.g. a ban on joining both the constabulary and the military) the German and Dutch Täufers initiated a secularist movement at least one and a half centuries before the better known Enlightenment advocates of separation of church and state issued their first authoritative statements on the subject.

Similarly, many attempts have been made, throughout the last several centuries, to grapple with issues of secularity and Islam from a top-down perspective. No attempt can be made here to give a representative overview of this lively discussion; however three scholars will be mentioned in following to illustrate similarities to the secularism debate in the West, namely the Transvaal Fatwa by Muhammad Abduh, Grand Mufti of Egypt in 1903, the introduction of the concept of *dar al-da'wa* by the Swiss theologian, Tariq Ramadan, almost one hundred years later, and a call for a coalition of political Christianity and political Islam by the English scholar Azzam Al-Tamini during a conference co-sponsored by the Lebanese Hezbollah research foundation, Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation, and the German Social Democratic development and training foundation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, (among others) in the late winter of this year.

As documented in the Shamil Jeppie's article on Islam in South Africa⁶, the Transvaal Fatwa dealt with three issues confronting the Shafi'i Muslims, of Dutch-Southeast Asian origin, and Hanafi Muslims, of British-South Asian origin at the beginning of the last century, i.e. the wearing of European style hats in order to blend into the business community, eating meat slaughtered by non-Muslims and finally the need to pray in one another's mosques because of the shared minority status in southern Africa. In all three instances, the Shafi'i Grand Mufti in Cairo answered in the affirmative, permitting Muslims to better fit into Western, Diaspora society, while simultaneously emphasizing the unity of Islam and primacy of faith over ethno-political differences.

Analyzing the transition in the thinking of Tariq Ramadan over the last few decades, Jorgen Nielsen illustrates that according to this thinker the fundamental rights of Muslims in Europe had been secured by the

end of the 20th century. Thus, Ramadan argues, Muslims should go on the offensive in a uniquely modern and simultaneously ancient manner.

At this point, like so many other Muslim thinkers, he finds models in the founding period of Islam to formulate new concepts which, he feels, are more helpful. He dismisses the traditional opposition of Islamic space (*dar al-islam*) versus the space of war (*dar al-harb*), but he also dismisses the more widespread view among European Muslims that Europe, because Muslims have rights, is a space of security (*dar al-amn*) or of treaty (*dar al-`ahd*), a concept which was to be found within the Shafi`i school of law. Instead he goes with a view that the real parallel to the present situation at the time of the Prophet was the period before the *hijrah* , the Meccan period, picking up the idea of Faysal Mawlawi that Europe and much of the contemporary world is a space for testimony, *dar al-da`wa* . 7

Ramadan calls on Muslims to "be determined to select in what Western culture produces in order to promote its positive contributions and to resist its destructive deviations;" to "strive to promote authentic religious and cultural pluralism;" as well as reject the tendency to "live in Europe out of Europe", "whereby Islam continues to find expression in traditional cultural forms." He bemoans that this insular position reduces the message of Islam "to its traditional or cultural dimension (...) because of a fear generated by the environment." 8

Finally, the points rose by Azzam Al-Tamini at the international conference on "The Islamic World and Europe: From Dialogue towards Understanding" in Beirut (17 – 19 February 2004), in a speech on "Freedom and human rights: individual identity and collective identity," highlight many aspects of current thinking on the role of Islam in a Western environment. Basing his presentation on koranic interpretation and Islamic traditions, Al-Tamini maintained, in a way not unsimilar to that of Muhammad Abduh and Tariq Ramadan, that the Muslim concept of piety could be translated in a modern context into a code of civic behavior. Ethical norms guaranteeing individual and minority group rights must be, according to Al-Tamini, rooted in a scholarly interpretation of scripture. This process is to be freed of all attempts to serve narrow sectarian or ethnic agendas.

Al-Tamini went one step further than the other two afore mentioned thinkers, however, by calling on Muslims in Europe to "search for elements in Western society who see that humanity is in danger." His call on European Christians to join ranks with Muslims to champion commonly held values, is reminiscent of various Christian-Muslim coalitions aimed at limiting the effects of secularism and other manifestations of liberal and leftist thinking. This proposal does not need to be interpreted in such a limited manner, and email conversations have led me to believe that Al-Tamini sees his call on those "Western elements" concerned about the undermining of societal values in a more progressive strain. 9

What all three approaches presented above have in common is the attempt to find scriptural justifications for adaptations in the approach of Islamic communities to challenges posed by the environments they have found in the West. What is largely missing is an attempt to discover whether Muslims as individual believers

(submitters) as well as the practice of Islam as a whole has actually profited from this transplanting from South East Asia, India or the Middle East to South Africa , Europe or North America . By choosing the word "profit" I intend to introduce two topics simultaneously, one, whether a socio-economic stratum of society has a vested interest in freeing itself from the confines of the "church-state embrace" and two, whether the struggle of Muslims to understand (ijtihad) and live according to (jihad) scripture will be thereby enhanced.

II. State religions are bad for business

In the concluding section of this paper, it will be argued that the modern Western experience with respect to politics, the economy and religion is now being duplicated within many Muslim communities in Europe . The justification for these assumptions is based on personal experience, working in projects in small cities and towns in Austria , on a study of the current literature on Islam in Europe as well as discussions with researchers and activists in the field 10 , mainly in Germany and the UK .

The Abrahamic "Other" Among Us

The idea that Muslims should only live in societies that are (if not exclusively then at least) overwhelmingly Islamic would seem to be more of an Arab than particularly Muslim concept. Typically, Muslims have never lived solely amongst themselves, but rather have regularly interacted with other religions as well as secular and non-religious groups. Today, the majority of Muslims live in states with huge, non-Muslim populations, including Indonesia, India and Malaysia. Thus, interestingly enough, Lebanon is indeed a typically Muslim, but not a typically Arab state, considering its significant Christian and secular communities. Though largely not appreciated in the West, even when Muslims did live in states based on Islamic law, under the control of Muslim rulers and religious elites, the *millet* system guaranteed a much higher degree of protection for Christians and Jews than was the case in Europe (with respect to Jews and Muslims) prior to the introduction of secular democracy.

The question at hand is thus not whether or not Muslims and Christians should interact or go their separate ways. Constructive Christian-Muslim dialogue is as old as the introduction of Islam itself; there is nothing new about this concept per se. Uniquely original is the notion that the Muslim "Other" is now an integral part of the European West, that Islam is confronting European society in the heartland and is no longer merely a phenomenon to be found and studied in some distant "Orient"; safely isolated from the daily lives and social interests of secular Europe.

Like Christians (and Jews), Muslims bring not only their religious and cultural expectations, but also their political norms and traditions with them when they migrate. The concept of a (re)introduction of faith-based politics in Europe may seem repugnant to many who have only recently escaped ideologically based dictatorships – as in the case of Central-Eastern and Eastern Europe – or have founded their long standing democracies on a strict separation of church and state – as in the case of most of Western Europe and North America. Indeed, theocratic regimes generally tend to be as oppressive, exploitative and corrupt as their non-

faith-based counterparts, be they fascist, militaristic or "real socialist" in nature. The lack of rule of law and a level playing field, so typical of all forms of dictatorship, deadens the entrepreneurial spirit and undermines an appreciation for delayed gratification. Indeed, states of religious oppression are bad for business; the instinctive European rejection of a religious-political interface is understandable.

Parenthetically, it should be briefly mentioned here, that historical examples do exist of Christian-Muslim political cooperation, significantly both in Romania 11 and Austria. The Habsburg Empire is the best example of a comprehensive integration of "political Islam" into the ruling elite of a major European power. During its brief liberal reform period, Austria passed a religious freedoms act, the 1874 Law of Recognition (*Anerkennungsgesetz von 20. Mai*), protecting all officially recognized faiths. Following the Congress of Berlin, Austria-Hungary occupied the former Ottoman regions of Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Sandshuk Novi Pazar in 1878. Thus, for the first time, predominantly Muslim regions of South Eastern Europe came under direct Central European control. In 1908, Bosnia-Herzegovina was officially annexed by the Habsburgs making the recognition of Islam as an official Austrian religion necessary. On 15 July 1912 *Das Islamgesetz* (Islamic Act) recognized the Hanefi branch of Sunni Islam. In 1983 the Second Austrian Republic removed this restriction, which only permitted the Hanefi branch of Islam, thus opening the process of state recognition to all Muslim denominations. 12

The political economy of Muslim-Christian relations

Considering the long history of Muslim tolerance vis-à-vis the Abrahamic "Other," and the relatively short period of European domination of the Orient, it would seem that there is room for hope. Muslim *dhimmi* and *millet* policies have known their dark moments 13 over the last one and a half millenniums and it would be counterproductive to deny the excesses of the Islamic ruling elites vis-à-vis the Christian and Jewish populations of the Middle East, North Africa, Sicily, France, Spain and the Balkans. However, the historical memory of the Arabic and Ottoman empires, with respect to "people of the book," remains largely positive. This is most likely because the leading nations in the former Muslim colonies in Europe established their own independent states many centuries ago and were even able to extend their influence deep within the Ottoman empire, in the form of "capitulation treaties" as early as the 1536, thus partially protecting, first the Roman Catholic and later the Eastern Orthodox occupied peoples of the region.

On the other hand, European domination of North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia began a mere two centuries ago, with the Napoleonic struggle to gain control of Egypt from the British. It enjoys, however, the advantage of having maintained a strong presence in the region to this very day, thus being the root for much of the animosity against the West currently prevalent in the Muslim world. Many inconsistencies in the "enlightened" colonialisation of the Muslim world are regularly cited by Muslim critics 14 throughout the region. By juxtaposing the historical Islamic domination of Europe with its counterpart, i.e. the modern control of Arab/Muslim affairs by the West, stark discrepancies become apparent. Whereas medieval and early modern Islamic colonisers remained largely even-handed when dealing with their respective Muslim, Christian and Jewish subjects, European imperialists rarely, if ever, extended their burgeoning, 19th and 20th century human rights agendas to non-European populations living within the confines of their extensive colonial possessions. Algerians, Egyptians and Lebanese as well as Indians, Indonesians and Malaysians were painfully aware of the fact that they were not "developed enough" to enjoy the fundamental civil and human rights, which had been established over time in Great Britain, France and the Netherlands and extended to the European colonialist settlers in Asia and Africa, by the beginning of the 20th century.

The result of European intransigence with respect to the social, religious and political rights of its subjects in the Islamic world proved to be highly detrimental. The very people that now make up a large majority of the Muslim communities in Europe were effectively excluded by their colonial rulers from developing the civil society skills that they would need once they moved to Europe during the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Though they are lacking the experience that their indigenous European neighbors were able to acquire over the last two hundred years of democracy in the West, Muslim immigrants have nevertheless demonstrated an impressive ability to catch up quickly. Practical hands-on experience has played a tremendous role in this respect. The following four topic areas are indicative of the fields in which Muslim communities have benefited from interaction with the West.

- **The impact of globalization** : satellite television and the internet break down government control of the media; financial feedback from the Western Diaspora through remittances introduce new economic ideas; return migration from the West provides a "braingain"; the challenge of prevalent Western educational and consumer entertainment products force local markets and educators to adapt.
- **The good practice, bottom line, cost-benefit-analysis arguments** : the capitalist market has proven to be a beneficial environment for Diaspora communities; Muslim immigrants are indeed "neo-classical, rational players", excelling whenever they find a level playing field in the West; trade flourishes only when based on reciprocity, business teaches the need for rule of law;
- **"organic" or de facto integration through outreach policies initiated by the host communities** : mandatory education integrates parents into the educational decision making process; labour unions enable immigrant workers to gain skills and experience as shop stewards and works council members; public service broadcasting introduces minority desks for radio and TV; immigrants are consumers and are taken seriously by advertisers; refugee elites (from civil wars or dictatorships) bring an influx of intellectuals, artists, business people who find rapid access to indigenous elites; Third World solidarity groups and the indigenous counter culture offer easier access to the "Other" and youth.;
- **intentional, codetermination policies** : indigenous civil society actors make space for immigrant representatives, e.g. labor leaders, church and interfaith initiatives, cooperation between charities, schools, universities; local politics offers integration to immigrants who have the right to vote, producing immigrant and minority clout; countries with restrictive naturalisation policies introduce immigrant councils (Ausländerbeirat) on the municipal and regional levels.

Most of the measures listed above are in some way related to economic processes. They are either the direct outcome of market forces or the result of social partnership (business-labour cooperation) institutions, which can be found in most Western European countries. This is a compilation of general factors and not the description of a situation that actually exists in any specific European country. 15

Practical implications

Recent studies carried out by Jorgen Nielsen, Nonneman/Niblock/Szajkowski and John Rex 16 all indicate that Muslim immigrant institutions are gradually adapting to their Western European environments. According to Nielson (2002) the Islamic groups originally set up by militant movements in countries as diverse as Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and Algeria were intent on transporting the conflicts in the homeland to the Diaspora centers of settlement in France, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland. This strategy has largely failed. Along with the long list of largely economic factors listed above, Nielsen mentions two additional reasons for the nascent acceptance of a *dar al-da'wa* (space of testimony) approach to Islam in Europe today. On the one hand, second and third generation Muslim immigrants tend to be less receptive to the messages of "missionaries from the old country," on the other, a small group of European Muslim leaders, most importantly Tariq Ramadan, are challenging the hegemony of the Islamic old guard.

Two Austrian cities, in which I have worked extensively over a period of almost 20 years, seem to substantiate these general claims. Both Salzburg (150,000 inhabitants) and Hallein (30,000) have very large immigrant communities totaling around 1/5 of the all inhabitants; in both cases the Muslims (from Turkey, Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo) make up about half of the minority population. Along the lines of the factors listed above the following can be ascertained:

- the Turkish and Balkan media are easily accessible, along with a wide range of global media products;
- immigrant entrepreneurs - especially from Turkey - play a major role in the retail sector and help integrate the entire community;
- "organic" integration has made great strides over the last 40 years, integrating elementary and secondary schools, labour unions and the counter culture;
- the local immigrants council movement introduced the *Ausländerbeirat* concept to Austria .

Overall, the Muslim immigrant community leaders have played a key role in initiating integrative measures, 17 surpassing the nominally Christian immigrant communities from Eastern and South Eastern Europe, who predominate numerically.

Putting the Debate Back on its Feet

All the points made above are, in essence, not new. By emphasizing the political economy of minority integration, in this case that of Islamic immigrants in Western Europe, a traditional preoccupation with theology and ideology has merely been somewhat corrected. If you will, a debate that had been "standing on its head" has been placed "back on its feet." Many indicators now seem to give hope that it is only a matter of time before the mainstream Muslim Diaspora in Europe will be successfully integrated into the continent's social and economic fabric. The issue of political integration is another question altogether.

Many national and European leaders in the EU have already taken a stance against a reintroduction of faith-based politics. While this theoretical controversy was raging on the highest levels of political interaction, Muslims in towns and metropolitan communities throughout the Union were beginning to introduce their faith into their politics on the local level in a highly practical manner. What does this mean for the other Abrahamic religions and especially for European Christians? Catholics, Orthodox and Protestants alike should ask themselves: "What is the added value of the existence of God?" If Christian social and political organizations are going to dialogue with likeminded Muslim organizations in the future they will need to be able to answer this question. Or to put this question to Christian faith-based organizations even more bluntly: "In a practical, day-to-day sense, does it really matter if God exists or not?"

The Islamic response to this rhetorical question must be obvious, and Muslim leaders and activists are developing new and innovative approaches to deal with a challenging but not unique Diaspora environment in Europe. Empirically, the Christian response for many decades has been, to "hide one's light under a bushel" (Mark 4:21). Whereas Muslim activists in the fields of youth employment, housing, women's rights, education, workers' rights, alternative globalization or the ecology constantly emphasize the faith foundation for their commitment and dedication, Christians active in NGOs, counter culture community centers, labour unions or feminist organizations rarely do the same.

Political Islam in Europe has announced that it is looking for partners in Western society in order to deal with the threats that are currently endangering our common Abrahamic values. Are European Christians willing – or even able – to respond?

Notes:

1. I will be referring to both the term *da'wa* (testimony), as used by Tariq Ramadan (1999, see J. Nielsen below) with respect to the concept of *dar al-da'wa* (space of testimony) during the early Meccan period, at the time of the Prophet before the *hijrah* (flight to Medina), and the term *shahada* (witnessing), as used in many verses in the Koran when dealing with the need for Muslims to openly live their faith even when they could expect persecution as a result. Also see *Islam and Martyrdom* , <http://www.mideastweb.org/log/archives/00000188.htm> , downloaded 27/Feb/04 for the Koranic concept of witnessing.

2. In this paper, the English word for community of believers in and/or submitters to the one Abrahamic God, i.e. "church", will be used when referring to both Christians and Muslims. It should be noted that just as Arab Christians refer to God in Arabic as Allah, as in "In **Allah** Rad" [so God will], the Christian equivalent of "Insh' **Allah** ," the Koran uses the term "ummah" when referring to a Jewish, Christian or Muslim community of believers, see: Ahmed Ali, *Al-Qur'an: A Contemporary Translation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 63, sura 3, *The Family of Imran* , verses 113-114, "Among the people of the Book there is a section [*ummah*] upright, who recite the scriptures in the hours of the night and bow in adoration and pray, and believe in God and the Last Day, and enjoin what is good and forbid what is wrong." In following, koranic books (sura) and verses will be cited as follows: (III:113-114) refers to sura three, verses 113-114.

3. This author is familiar with the attempt to distinguish between secularism and secularity, laïcisme et laïcité or almania wa almana, in order to justify positions taken by the church-state alliance as of the reign of the "Christian" Emperor Constantine in the 4th century AD. It will be argued in following that secularism was indeed a uniquely Christian form of political analysis, which placed political leaders willing to use force, for whatever reason, outside the Kingdom of God .

4. The most important Social Democratic work on the Taufers was written by Karl Kautsky, *Vorläufer des neueren Sozialismus, zweiter Band: Der Kommunismus in der deutschen Reformation* (Berlin, 1923); the following authors have dealt with the various aspects of the political economy of the Taufer movement, Cornelius Dyck, *An Introduction to Mennonite History: A Popular History of the Anabaptists and the Mennonites* (Herald: Scottsdale, PA, 1981), Walter Klaasen, "Pilgram Marpeck: Freiheit ohne Gewalt," in *Radikale Reformatoren: 21 biographische Skizzen von Thomas Münzer bis Paracelsus* , ed. Hans-Jürgen Goertz (Munich 1978), 146-154; Rudolf Palme, "Zur Täuferbewegung in Tirol," in *Die Täuferbewegung/L'Anabaptistismo: Gaismaiertage zum 450. Todestag Jakob Hutters (1536-1986)* eds. Günther Pallaver and Christoph von Hartungen (Scolast: Bolzano, 1986). For a fuller overview of the influence of the Taufer movement on Alpine mining communities, see references to Gross, Kripp, Kuppelwieser, Packull, Rudolf, Sinzinger, Widmoser and Zimmermann in Gene R. Sensenig, *Bergbau in Südtirol , Von der Altiroler Bergbautradition zur modernen italienischen Montanindustrie – Eine Sozialgeschichte* (Grauwerte: Salzburg, 1990), 66-71.

5. See the chapter on "Die soziale Lage im heiligen Land Tirol" [The social conditions in Tirol , God's own country] in Sensenig, *Bergbau in Südtirol*, 66-71.

6. Shamil Jeppie, "Commemorations and Identities: The 1994 Tercentenary of Islam in South Africa , " in *Islam and the Question of Minorities* , ed. Tamara Sonn (Scholars: Atlanta, 1996), 73-92.

7. Jorgen Nielsen, "New centres and peripheries in European Islam?" in *Islam and the Shaping of the Current Islamic Reformation* , ed. B. Roberson, *Mediterranean Politics* , vol.7, no.3 (autumn 2002), 16. This text was emailed to me by the author, thus the page numbers reflect those of the attached Word text and not the published hardcopy version. Quotes taken from: Tariq Ramadan, *To be a European Muslim* , (Islamic Foundation: Leicester, 1999).

8. Jorgen Nielsen, *New centres and peripheries*, 16-17.

9. No written transcript for Al-Tamini's presentation is currently available and the organisers have yet to decide whether or not the proceedings will be published. The information contained in this paper is based on this author's notes during the conference, which were corroborated via email by the speaker.

10. I wish to especially thank John Esposito, Jorgen Nielsen, Peter Mandaville (George Mason University, USA), Wahida Schaffi (Community Speak, Bradford, UK) and Ajmal Masroor (Islamic Society of Britain, London), who were kind enough to permit me to bounce my ideas off them during various conferences in the Middle East over the last year and a half.

11. According to the Romanian "Fifteenth periodic reports of States parties due in 1999: Romania. 17/05/99 . CERD/C/363/Add.1. (State Party Report)," to the United Nations, <http://www.hri.ca/forthecord1999/documentation/tbodies/cerd-c-363-add1.htm>, retrieved 13/Oct/2004, there are 55,000 Turk-Tatar Muslims in the country at present. A report to the "Islam and Europe: Eye Contact International Conference," which took place in the fall of this year (01-06/October/2004) in Ankara emphasized that the Dobrudja Turks and Tartars have enjoyed ongoing special religious and ethnic rights in Romania, following the annexation of this historically Ottoman region in 1878: Alexandru Balas (Civitas99, Bucharest), report to the Workshop "Muslim Minorities in Europe," <http://www.aegge->

ankara.org/eyecontact/. Along the same lines: "Ethnic Turks, or Tartar Muslims, inhabit a region south from the Danube delta, and they are the vestiges of the extended Turkish suzerainty over the principality of Wallachia. Muslims have 82 mosques and about 40 imams. Being a small community of about 45,000, they were not the focus of atheistic communist policies. What is noticeable regarding Romania's Muslims is the simple fact that they live in harmony with Christians. Although they are descendants of the conquerors under whom the Romanians suffered so much, there seems to be no hostility toward them. The reconciliation of these two former enemies, the Romanians and the Turks and Tartars, is a promising token."
http://www.georgefox.edu/academics/undergrad/departments/soc-swk/ree/lakatos_den.html, retrieved 13/Oct/2004.

12. Andreas Schuster, *Islam in Wien, Eine sozialgeographische Spurensuche, Bestandsaufnahme und Prognose, mit Gedanken zu einem österreichweiten Entwicklungsbild*, MA Thesis (Diplomarbeit), Universität Wien (Vienna, 1994).

13. See: <http://www.dhimmi.org/> for example for a highly critical appraisal of Muslim tolerance over the centuries.

14. See Dima Dabbous-Sensenig, "From defending 'cultural exception' to promoting 'cultural diversity': European cultural policy and the Arab World," in *Globalization, audiovisual industry and cultural diversity*, Quaderns del CAC, 14/2002, 35.

15. For more background on the religious implications of these developments see: Eugene Sensenig-Dabbous, "What is the Added Value of 'Religion' in Multicultural Discourse?," in *God in Multicultural Society: Religion, Politics and Globalisation*, ed. George McLain (The Council in Values & Philosophy: Washington, DC, forthcoming).

16. Jorgen Nielsen, *Towards a European Islam* (Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations: Birmingham, 1999), Gerd Nonneman, Tim Niblock, Bogdan Szajkowski, *Muslim Communities in the New Europe* (Ithica Press: Reading, UK, 1997), John Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State* (MacMillan: London, 1996).

17. Extensive personal interaction in the 1990s and email contact in the 2000s with AGAH Hessen, a leading German immigrants council association (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Ausländerbeiräte Hessen-Landesausländerbeirat), have convinced me that both in Austria and Germany this form of minority integration can prove very affective despite the highly restrictive naturalization laws existing in both countries: see <www.agah-hessen.de>.